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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Chase Manhattan Bank appeals the District Court's 
denial of its Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration 
of the final judgment excluding Chase from the settlement 
of a securities fraud action that investors br ought against 
Cendant. Chase's portion of the settlement fund, which 
would have exceeded $23 million, reverts to Cendant under 
the terms of the settlement Stipulation. Specifically, Chase 
claims alternatively, either that its handling of its claims 
did not constitute neglect on its part, or that the District 
Court erred in failing to apply correctly the standards for 
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determining "excusable neglect" in denying Chase's proof of 
claim.1 
 
Cendant counters Chase's appeal on numerous gr ounds, 
only one of which we need consider in this appeal, the 
other claims having been resolved against Cendant in our 
opinion in a related case, In re Cendant Corporation Prides 
Litigation, No. 00-5199, slip op. (3d Cir . Nov. ___, 2000).2 
Cendant's sole remaining counter-ar gument is that the 
District Court properly denied Chase the ability to 
participate in the settlement because Chase failed to 
demonstrate "excusable neglect." Because the facts before 
us are incomplete, and because the District Court did not 
make clear its reasoning and application of the"excusable 
neglect" factors, we find that we do not have a sufficient 
basis to review the District Court's ruling for abuse of 
discretion. See Gunter v. Ridgewood Ener gy, 223 F.3d 190 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We need not reach Chase's arguments regarding its motion to extend 
the time for filing an appeal. The District Court disallowed Chase's 
claims by an order dated January 14, 2000, and this order was certified 
as appealable on February 22, 2000. Chase missed the thirty day period 
for filing an appeal from this decision, but later filed a motion asking 
the 
District Court to extend the time for filing an appeal pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). The District Court denied the motion 
and Chase appeals. Even if we were to rule in Chase's favor on this 
score, however, the most that we could possibly do is consider the record 
that was before the District Court on January 14, 2000. See United 
States v. Gilchrist, 215 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2000) ("An argument not 
raised in the district court is not properly pr esented for appellate 
review."). Because Chase had provided no excuse for its late cures as of 
that date, we would be compelled (on that recor d) to affirm the District 
Court's disallowance of Chase's claims. 
 
In light of our disposition, we also need not consider Chase's argument 
that the short cure period and the allegedly inadequate notice of the 
need to submit excuses to preserve claims worked a due process 
violation in this case. Finally, we decline to consider Chase's argument 
that its initial proofs of claim were valid. 
 
2. In 00-5199, we concluded that the District Court had retained the 
discretion to allow late-filed and late-cur ed claims. Equally applicable 
here (though that case involved Fed. R. Civ. P . 6(b)(2) and this case 
involves Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)) is our second conclusion in 00-5199 that 
the appropriate standard under which to evaluate requests to allow tardy 
proofs of claim or cures is "excusable neglect." 
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(3d Cir. 2000). We will, therefor e, vacate the District Court's 
decision and remand this case to the District Court 
with directions to undertake a more thor ough 
determination, with requisite factualfindings, of whether 
the circumstances support Chase's claims of"excusable 
neglect." 
 
Because related litigation is already the subject of at least 
three published opinions, each exhaustively setting forth 
the procedural and factual background, we will not do so 
here, but instead refer interested parties to these prior 
dispositions.3 We set forth only those facts crucial to a 




This appeal is one of several which arise out of the large 
securities fraud class action (Cendant PRIDES litigation) 
involving Cendant and its former officers. In June 1999, the 
District Court approved a $340 million settlement of the 
Cendant PRIDES class action litigation. Under the terms of 
the Stipulation of Agreement of Settlement and 
Compromise (the "Stipulation"), Cendant agreed to 
distribute one Right, with a theoretical value of $11.71, for 
each PRIDES owned as of the close of business on April 15, 
1998. See also In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 51 F. Supp. 
2d at 539-40. To collect the Rights, each PRIDES owner 
was required to submit a valid proof of claim by June 18, 
1999. The proofs of claim could take the for m of "monthly 
brokerage account statements," or if PRIDES were not held 
in brokerage accounts, the form of "business records 
maintained in the ordinary course of business." Under the 
terms of the Settlement Hearing Order , a settlement 
administrator, Valley Forge Administrative Services, was to 
verify the proofs of claim. The Rights, which are publicly 
traded, expire on February 14, 2001, when, in combination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998), In re Cendant 
Corp. Prides Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D.N.J. 1999), and In re Cendant 
Corp. Prides Litig., 189 F.R.D. 321 (D.N.J. 1999), provide a full factual 
and procedural history of this litigation. 
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with the current PRIDES, they will be exchanged for new 
PRIDES.4 
 
Chase is custodian for three mutual funds in which it 
held PRIDES: Capital Income Builder, Inc. ("CIB"), Income 
Fund of America ("IFA"), and Capital and World Growth and 
Income, Inc. ("World Growth"). As of April 15, 1998, Chase 
held 400,000 PRIDES for CIB, with a settlement value of 
$4,684,000; 1,400,000 PRIDES for IFA, with a settlement 
value of $16,394,000; and 220,000 PRIDES for W orld 
Growth, with a settlement value of $2,576,200; with a total 
of $23,654,200 for all three funds. Pursuant to the terms of 
the Stipulation, Chase submitted three timely proofs of 
claim to participate in that settlement. For two of the 
claims, IFA and World Growth, the administrator requested 
of Chase additional documentation, that is, the 
administrator sent a Request to Cure. Chase supplied the 
additional information, and though it was apparently sent 
four days late, the administrator approved the IFA and 
World Growth claims. 
 
Cendant moved to disallow Chase's claims and those of 
other class members because of various minor filing delays. 
Chase alleges that neither Cendant, the PRIDES Class, nor 
the District Court, notified it of either that motion or the 
resulting Court ruling that claimants had to submit an 
excuse for any delay in order to preserve a claim.5 That is 
why, maintains Chase, it did not submit an excuse. As a 
result, the District Court, on January 14, 2000, denied 
Chase's claims. On February 23, 2000, the District Court 
certified its January order as final and appealable. As to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Cendant agreed to issue two New Income Prides or two New Growth 
Prides to any person who delivered to Cendant three Rights, together 
with existing Income or Growth Prides, r espectively, before the 
expiration 
of the close of business on February 14, 2001, unless the Prides are 
amended. Id. Because time is short, the District Court should expedite 
its consideration of this case. We also dir ect the Clerk of this Court 
that 
any further appeals should be assigned to this panel. 
 
5. To support its allegation that alter natively Cendant, the PRIDES 
Class, and the District Court at various points failed to send it crucial 
notices, Chase asserts that other class members wer e similarly 
neglected, and consequently, failed to comply with r equests or to meet 
deadlines. 
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the CIB claim, though the administrator asserts that it sent 
a Request to Cure, Chase claims that the letter was never 
received. The administrator denied that claim for failure to 
cure. 
 
Chase insists that it first learned of these dispositions in 
April of 2000, and on April 24, 2000, filed a motion under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) to vacate the denial of its claims 
and to extend the time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5). On 
June 8, 2000, the District Court denied Chase's motion, 
though as Chase notes, the District Court found that 
permitting late-curing claimants to participate in the 




Chase challenges the District Court's denial of its 60(b) 
motion to permit it to participate in the underlying 
settlement. Specifically, Chase asserts on appeal that the 
District Court erred in refusing to excuse Chase's delays in 
providing excuses for earlier minor filing delays due to lack 
of notice and the District Court failed to apply pr operly the 
standards for determining "excusable neglect" outlined in 
Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Ptrshp , 507 
U.S. 380 (1993). The District Court, maintains Chase, 
erroneously applied to Chase's IFA, W orld Growth, and CIB 
funds, the presumption that Chase received various 
notices, when the funds had not. Chase insists that had 
the District Court properly applied the law it would have 
excused the delay and permitted Chase to participate in the 
settlement, based upon the following factors, among others: 
lack of prejudice to Cendant; the inconsequential four-day 
delay as to IFA and World Growth; Chase's timely filing of 
its 60(b) motion; the delay's lack of impact on the judicial 
proceedings; class notices which were confusing or not 
received, and Chase's unchallenged good faith in handling 
the claims of all three funds. 
 
We review the District Court's denial of the 60(b) motion 
for abuse of discretion.7 In re: O'Brien Envntl. Energy, 188 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See infra note 8. 
7. The analysis in this case parallels that in a related case, In re 
Cendant 
Corporation Prides Litigation, No. 00-5198, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov. ___, 
2000). For purposes of clarity, pertinent portions of 00-5198 are 
repeated here. 
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F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1999). W e have held as to abuse of 
discretion, generally, that "an abuse of discretion arises 
when the [D]istrict [C]ourt's decision r ests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact." Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 
2000 WL 1517673, at *7 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
An abuse of discretion may also occur "when no reasonable 
person would adopt the district court's view." Id. Finally, 
"we will not interfere with the [D]istrict [C]ourt's exercise of 
discretion unless there is a definite and firm conviction that 
the court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the 
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the r elevant 
factors." Id. 
 
 A. The 60(b) "Excusable Neglect" Analysis  
 
Our prime inquiry is whether Chase should have been 
relieved from the effects of the District Court's January 22, 
2000 order denying its claims. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
Rule 60. Relief From Judgment or Or der 
 
* * * 
 
       (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
       Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon 
       such terms as are just, the court may r elieve a party or 
       a party's legal representative fr om a final judgment, 
       order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
       mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect 
       . . . or (6) any other reason justifying r elief from the 
       operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
       within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and 
       (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, 
       or proceeding was entered or taken. 
 




In Pioneer, supra, the Supreme Court delineated the 
analysis required for a finding of "excusable neglect" (made 
applicable to Rule 60(b) though Pioneer was a bankruptcy 
case) and held that courts are permitted, where 
appropriate, to accept late filings even wher e caused by 
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inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by 
intervening circumstances beyond a party's control. At the 
outset, the Supreme Court pronounced that the inquiry is 
essentially equitable and necessitates considering a 
situation's totality: 
 
       Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for 
       determining what sorts of neglect will be considered 
       "excusable," we conclude that the deter mination is at 
       bottom an equitable one, taking account of all r elevant 
       circumstances surrounding the party's omission. 
 
Id. at 395. 
 
While "all relevant circumstances" are properly 
considered, the Supreme Court specifically delineated four 
factors: 
 
       These include . . . the danger of prejudice to the 
       debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact 
       on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, 
       including whether it was within the reasonable control 
       of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good 
       faith. 
 
Id. In the wake of Pioneer, we have imposed a duty of 
explanation on District Courts when they conduct 
"excusable neglect" analysis. In Chemetr on Corp. v. Jones, 
72 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 1995), we addr essed the Bankruptcy 
Rule that permits courts to accept late-filed claims when 
the late-filing was due to "excusable neglect." In Chemetron 
we held that the bankruptcy court's "analysis failed to 
adequately consider the totality of the circumstances 
presented." Id. at 349. Specifically, we faulted the court for 
failing "to make additional relevant factualfindings, 
including the danger of prejudice to the debtor , the length 
of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 
proceedings, the reason for the delay, and whether the 
movant acted in good faith." Id. at 350. We thus 
"remand[ed] the issue to the bankruptcy court, with 
directions [to] undertake a more comprehensive and 
thorough determination of whether the totality of the 
circumstances support claimants' defense of`excusable 
neglect.' " Id.; see also O'Brien , 188 F.3d at 127 (faulting a 
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district court for not making specific findings as to 
prejudice). 
 
In our view, the District Court's June 7, 2000, decision 
suffers from the same deficiencies identified in Chemetron 
and O'Brien. For example, there is not any indication that 
the District Court ever separately considered the CIB claim. 
Though the District Court devotes four pages to a 
discussion of Chase's "excuses," the only mention of CIB 
regards Chase's assertion that the administrator should 
have sent the Request to Cure to CIB one day earlier than 
it did. Certainly, absent from the discussion is a point by 
point analysis of prejudice, delay, potential impact on 
judicial proceedings, or the reason for the delay (with 
respect to CIB) that our earlier cases contemplated. 
 
With regard to the IFA and W orld Growth claims, the 
District Court failed to address with specificity: whether 
Cendant would suffer any prejudice if Chase's motion were 
granted8; the length of the delay and, particularly, what 
effect it would have on judicial administration; and whether 
Chase acted in good faith. We find that this lack of 
explanation violates the principles we established in 
Chemetron. 
 
The "reason" for the delay is the one Pioneer factor that 
the District Court expressly considered. W e conclude, 
nevertheless, that the District Court inadequately analyzed 
even this factor. Under O'Brien, the relevant question is 
whether Chase has a valid reason for waiting so long in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note, nonetheless, that in ter ms of prejudice to Cendant, the 
District Court found on October 21, 1999, that Cendant would not suffer 
any prejudice when the District Court extended the deadline for filing 
initial proofs of claim from June 18 to September 7, 1999. The Court 
found that Cendant would not be harmed because the original limits of 
Cendant's financial obligation has not been expanded. Cendant's 
argument that it is now prejudiced because the settlement money which 
might now go to Chase will not remain for Cendant to recoup is without 
merit. In truth, since the only "prejudice" Cendant would suffer by being 
forced to pay Chase is the "loss of a windfall," we conclude that Cendant 
will not suffer any prejudice. See O'Brien, 188 F.3d at 128; and In re 
Cendant Corporation Prides Litigation, No. 00-5199, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov. 
___, 2000) for further discussion of the District Court's finding that a 
time extension would not prejudice Cendant. 
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bringing forward its explanation for its late cures. Chase 
claims that it "delayed" because it assumed that its cure 
documentation had been accepted, and, therefor e, it did not 
have any reason to "explain" its late submission. 
 
The record on appeal discloses that, first, Chase received 
Requests to Cure the IFA and World Growth claims on July 
28, 1999. Under the terms of these letters, Chase was 
required to respond by August 4. It did not do so. Nor did 
Chase explain the late cures when it sent its r esponses on 
August 12. Second, the administrator sent Chase additional 
letters by regular mail dated August 5, 1999, r equesting 
additional information. Chase's Class Action Group did not 
receive these letters until November 15, 1999, and did not 
respond until January 4, 2000. Third, on January 24, 
2000, a Chase employee in Brooklyn received a letter, 
which had been sent by Federal Express, fr om the PRIDES 
Class. That letter informed Chase that the District Court 
had disallowed the IFA and World Gr owth claims, but the 
letter mistakenly stated that the deadline for filing an 
appeal was February 14, 2000. This letter was "lost" in 
Chase's interoffice mail system while en r oute to Chase's 
Class Action Group. 
 
The District Court pointed to each of these facts and held 
that they demonstrated that Chase did not have a valid 
reason for delay. The District Court explained:"The Court 
finds that it cannot ignore Chase's own deficiencies in 
handling the Cendant class action correspondence." 
Although these facts ultimately may mitigate against Chase, 
several issues remain unresolved which may bear on the 
culpability question. Chase's own deficiencies, however, do 
not automatically bar a finding of "excusable neglect." In 
O'Brien, we held that, when considering the r eason for a 
movant's delay, a District Court must examine both parties' 
conduct, and we specifically concluded that a movant's 
negligence can still be excusable if it were due, in part, to 
the conduct of another party. See O'Br ien, 188 F.3d at 128. 
In short, with respect to Pioneer's"reason for the delay" 
factor, the District Court should have examined both the 
administrator's and the PRIDES Class' actions in 
determining whether Chase's delay were excusable. The 
District Court did not do so. 
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At best, the District Court's opinion denying Chase's 
60(b) motion does not address three of the four factors 
outlined in Pioneer. We thus find that in failing to apply the 
Pioneer factors, the District Court did not act in the sound 
exercise of its discretion. At this juncture, we would 
normally review de novo the substantive matter of whether 
"excusable neglect" excuses Chase's delay in submitting the 
proof of claims. O'Brien, 188 F .3d at 122 (in determining 
whether there exists an error, the Court of Appeals will 
"review de novo the District Court's application of the law 
to the facts"); see also 3d. Cir. L.A. R. 28(b)(review is 
plenary where lower court erred in applying a legal precept). 
That inquiry, however, requires our own application of the 
law to the facts; unfortunately, we find that because such 
significant gaps remain in the factual findings, we are 
frustrated in our ability to make a proper determination. 
 
B. Factual Gaps in the Record 
 
We find that the District Court did not r esolve several 
factual disputes bearing on the degree to which other 
parties bear responsibility for Chase's delay in providing an 
excuse for its late cures. Though not exhaustive, we offer 
the following examples of pending factual issues: 9 
 
(1) Cendant alleges that the administrator sent letters to 
       Chase on August 27, 1999, advising it that its cur e 
       documentation had been submitted late and 
       suggesting that it provide the District Court a reason 
       for the late cures by September 6, 1999. These letters 
       are critical and represent the only notice that Chase is 
       alleged to have received directing it to submit excuses 
       for its late cures. Chase denies receiving these letters. 
       Whether these letters were sent, and if so, which party 
       lost them, matters considerably. Nevertheless, the 
       District Court did not make a finding in its opinion as 
       to whether these letters were sent or r eceived. 
 
(2) In its October 21, 1999, Order, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The record also appears unclear as to whether Chase ever received a 
request to cure or a notice of rejection for the CIB claim. At oral 
argument, however, Chase's counsel conceded that the District Court 
had made a factual finding that Chase received these letters. 
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       stated that late-cure claimants, such as IF A and World 
       Growth, would be allowed to participate in the 
       settlement only if they could demonstrate that the late 
       cures were due to "excusable neglect." The PRIDES 
       Class counsel apparently did not seek an explanation 
       from Chase. Cendant defends this decision by ar guing 
       that the District Court was unwilling to consider any 
       explanation that had not been offered prior to 
       September 7, 1999. The District Court's June, 2000, 
       opinion is not clear as to whether Cendant's assertion 
       is correct, and the District Court did not make any 
       finding as to whether the PRIDES Class counsel was 
       obligated to notify Chase. 
 
(3) Cendant maintains that the PRIDES Class counsel 
       sent the January notification letter to a Chase office in 
       Brooklyn, notwithstanding Chase's designation of a 
       Manhattan Post Office box as its contact addr ess, 
       presumably because the letter was to be sent by 
       Federal Express which does not deliver to post office 
       boxes. The District Court should have examined, but 
       did not, Chase's choice of Federal Express, per haps as 
       well as the veracity of the claim that Federal Expr ess 
       does not deliver to post office boxes. Arguably, this 
       point is important because had the letter been sent in 
       the usual fashion to the designated address, 
       presumably it would not have been lost or delayed. 
 
(4) Chase insists that the PRIDES Class counsel should 
       have faxed the January notification letter to its Class 
       Action Group. Cendant counters that, thr ough no fault 
       of its own, the PRIDES Class counsel did not have 
       Chase's fax number. The District Court never evaluated 
       these assertions, which are important for assessing the 




After a careful review of the recor d, we find that the 
District Court's opinion denying Chase's 60(b) motion fails 
to address three of the four requir ed Pioneer factors. 
Furthermore, without the District Court's resolution of 
unsettled factual disputes, such as those set out above, we 
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are unable to determine whether the District Court properly 
exercised its discretion in applying the r eason for the delay 
factor. In Gunter, supra, we vacated an award of attorney's 
fees because a District Court had failed to explain its 
decision adequately. We wrote: "Notwithstanding our 
deferential standard of review, it is incumbent upon a 
district court to make its reasoning and application of the 
. . . jurisprudence clear, so that we, as a r eviewing court, 
have a sufficient basis to review for abuse of discretion." 
Gunter, 223 F.3d at 196. Thus, we will vacate the District 
Court's June 8, 2000, order and will remand this matter to 
the District Court for fact-finding and a thor ough, 
systematic, application of the law to the facts. 
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